The ANC, COPE and the DA in a rapidly maturing Democratic South Africa

Contrary to popular belief, the ANC is not first and foremost a political party, but rather a liberation movement which has, since 1994, been attempting the near impossible task of transforming itself into a homogenous political party.

The ANC was established in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) to pursue the interests of the oppressed black South African population living under the laws and social constructs that came to be the most formalised racial discrimination in the world: Apartheid.  Between 1912 and 1994, the ANC defined itself around the singular challenge of securing a free and equal South Africa for all South Africans, regardless of their race.

During the 82 years between 1912 and 1994, the ANC gradually transformed from a pressure group into a militant liberation movement.  During those years the organisation utilised every conceivable form of campaigning, protests, passive resistance, international appeals and the like before eventually resorting to armed resistance in the 1980s.

The ANC’s membership comprised everyone willing and interested in a free and equal South Africa; anyone interested in the liberation of non-white South Africans from the injustices of the Apartheid regime.  The membership of the ANC was thus not as one might find in a traditional political party such as the Democratic Alliance – an organisation rooted in liberal politics, and thus comprising largely liberal thinking South Africans – but rather it was diverse in political ideology, ranging from communists to capitalists, all united under the banner of liberation.

When freedom came to South African in 1994, the ANC as a liberation movement achieved the goal which it had worked to secure for over 80 years, and thus began the transition from liberation movement to political party.  Since 1994 the ANC has struggled to unite ideologies within its ranks ranging from peaceful free market capitalism to militant communism, and the recent rift which saw the birth of another political party was the inevitable result. The ANC is rapidly maturing into a more leftist political party and is shedding much of the ideological baggage that its current leadership bloc no longer tolerates.

The split of the ANC spells the death of this liberation movement and sees the birth of one political party and the purification of another.  The ANC will finally have ideological purity, more left leaning than it has been since 1994; and the Congress of the People (COPE) will attract the more centrist and progressive members of the ANC.

These events will go some way to bringing clarity to the voter, letting them know exactly what the ANC is and what it stands for.  The voices of Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema, influenced as they are by their SACP and COSATU alliance partners, will no longer be tempered by moderate or liberal ANC leaders who have attempted to maintain the centrist image of the ANC.

COPE and a resurgent Democratic Alliance (DA) pose a significant threat to ANC dominance in post-independence South Africa.  COPE will appeal to a range of South Africans for a variety reasons from ethnicity, where it is perceived as being Xhosa aligned, to competence where it may be able to lay claim to having attracted more qualified and experienced leaders and politicians from the ANC and other parties.

The DA has a new leader in Helen Zille who is as yet untested in a major election, but if the results of the recent round of by-elections in South Africa are anything to go by (the DA won as many wards as the ANC, 11, followed by COPE with 10), then the DA should have a good showing in the April 2009 poll.  Helen Zille has proven herself able to connect and identify with the average South African and her prominent and effective mayorship of the City of Cape Town has won her many supporters, especially from the Coloured community.

Many prominent South Africans, most notably Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of the ANC government, especially with regard to pertinent issues such as the provision of basic services, housing, land reform and crime.  Tutu recently publicly expressed his intention to withhold his vote in the upcoming poll in what has become a clear example to other disenchanted ANC supporters that they can apply pressure on their party without actually voting against it.

In the two polls since 1994, the number of voters turning out for the ANC has dropped by an average of 1.5 million votes.  The ANC, however, managed to increase its winning margin due to the decrease of more than 3 million voters participating in the polls as a whole.  The notable exception to this trend has been the Democratic Alliance who, as the Democratic Party, secured only 1.73% in 1994 but won significant increases at each of the 1999 and 2004 polls.  Nearly six times as many people voted for the DA in 2004 than did for the DP in 1994, resulting in an over 7-fold increase in the percentage vote when compared with 1994.

Table 1: Comparison of Election Results since 1994


ANC Votes


DA Votes

DA %

Total Votes



















The emergence of COPE and its mobilisation of a significant proportion of ANC supporters, atop widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the ANC, pose a very real threat to the ANC at the upcoming poll.  The Democratic Alliance’s recent by-election successes and increasingly popular leader also hint at the possibility of a significant increase in DA support in April.

Consider a scenario where the Democratic Alliance, with a revitalised brand and Helen Zille at the helm, manage to increase their support to 17.5% of the total vote by consolidating opposition support and winning over a small number of ANC voters; COPE secure 10%, largely from ANC voters but potentially also consolidating the opposition vote; and minority parties such as the IFP, UDM, ID, ACDP, FF+, MF manage to secure 15% (down from around 17% in 2004).

Such a scenario would leave the ANC with 57.5% of the vote and only 230 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly (down from 279 in 2004), revoking the constitutional majority held by the ANC since 2004.  Additionally, were the ANC to lose control of the Western Cape, the Northern Cape and possibly the Eastern Cape, this would result in the upper house of Parliament, the National Council of Provinces, becoming a more useful democratic institution than it is now.  Presently, the ANC controls all 9 provinces and the NCOP effectively rubber-stamps all resolutions sent through the house.

The changes in the South African political landscape since the recall of President Mbeki in late September last year have been numerous and significant.  The recall of the President on the basis of a court judgement that has since been set aside, alienated with finality many ANC supporters from the post-Polokwane leadership of the Party.  The decision created the precedent upon which the National Convention was called and held in Sandton and ultimately, The Congress of the People formed, all within less than 3 months of President Mbeki leaving office.

Democracy in South Africa will be strengthened in three significant regards as a result of these changes, making 2009 the most important year for South Africa since 1994.  First, and most importantly, ANC will find it extremely difficult to maintain more than two-thirds of the vote and will thus lose its constitutional majority.  Second, the emergence of COPE will add another opposition voice to the fray, greatly increasing the number of people who can oppose abuse of power or poor performance by the ANC. Third, the potential is created for COPE and DA to form coalitions to win provinces and municipalities and ultimately work closely together to form a united opposition – with a merger a real possibility within 10 or even 5 years of this election.

The election in April this year provides an opportunity for every South African to make their choice about the direction our democracy takes.  In the 15 years under the stewardship of the ANC the South African Government has failed to realise the potential this country holds to create prosperity for all.  Every South African must be encouraged to make their mark and get out and vote for CHANGE.

The State of the Nation: A Response

I write this response as proud 25 year old South African living in Durban. I will acknowledge now that I am writing this letter from the ‘ivory tower’ that is the upper-middle class lifestyle that many white South Africans are fortunate to be living in. I do not believe, however, that my fortunate socio-economic status renders me any less qualified to comment on the state of our Nation than any other South African.

In 1994, to a 12 year old boy, the miracle taking place in our country was not something I was able to fully understand. Fortunately, with the support of my ex-Rhodesian parents, I came to understand just how important freedom was to the majority of South Africans and how unique the South African passage to democracy had been when compared with the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia example and, indeed, that of virtually every other African state.

I was proud: proud to be a part of the miracle; proud of our people and their willingness to work together for greater good; and in the early years that followed, proud of the achievements of the Government of National Unity and the new ANC-led government under Nelson Mandela.

Mr Mbeki was someone I was intensely proud of – he was a moderate and reasonable President, which, after the magic of Madiba, was what the young South African democracy needed. ‘Mr Delivery’ was going to see to it that the ANC did indeed create a better life for all by focusing on the delivery of basic services to the poor, growth in the economy and the creation of jobs.

Unfortunately, President Mbeki remains somebody who I was proud of. In time he showed himself to be consistently poor in his leadership of both Government and the ANC. South Africa can be thankful it got a centrist leader in Mbeki, but further than the political and economic stability such a leader provides, our President failed to deliver on his party’s promises to the people of South Africa.

ANC MP Kader Asmal, who will be retiring from Politics this year, was forthright about the risks involved in Government’s ever aggressive stance on transformation at a recent conference on racism: “People are being appointed who have no experience. We need to do an introspective evaluation of affirmative action. You can’t employ a tone deaf person to direct an orchestra or a brain surgeon who doesn’t know science.”

Minerals and Energy Minister, Buyelwa Sonjica, said in Parliament that “[the] government cannot give up its transformation targets in order to solve the energy crisis”. In 2001, Robert Mugabe led his government in Zimbabwe, in a grand manifestation of what I believe is the same sentiment expressed by Minister Sonjica, to seize white-owned commercial farms because land reform was more important that safeguarding the fundamentals of the Zimbabwean economy.

In that single campaign, Mugabe effectively whipped the rug from beneath the feet of the Zimbabwean economy and in the wake of the resultant crises, greatly reduced the means with which the Government could, if it wanted to, support the people of Zimbabwe – all in the name of the people.

In South Africa, the Land Bank is a key state institution in the drive to effect land reform and more importantly, the promotion of sustainable and economically productive activity in the agricultural sector. A forensic audit of the Land Bank, performed at the instruction of cabinet by Deloitte & Touche in 2007 brought to light the misappropriation of at least R20 billion worth of agricultural development funding in a stark example of the ANC Government’s wavering focus as cronyism and patronage politics take root. The credibility of the Land Bank came into question again at the end of the February 2008 when their auditors Ernst & Young indicated that unless the bank appointed senior officials with suitable qualifications it would terminate its relationship with the bank.

If one day the South African Government decided to answer the land reform question in a manner similar to what happened in Zimbabwe in 2001, would it be because of unwillingness on the part of white farmers to sell land that they, reasonably, feel they have claim to – quite possibly; but will it also be because the Department tasked with resolving this critical and sensitive issue was fraught with incompetence, mismanagement and corruption – most definitely.

Economic growth is the fundamental underpinning precursor to Government meeting its Millennium Development Goals by 2014, and electricity is fundamental to that growth. Indeed, the top 5 of the President’s list of Apex Priorities were related to “the further acceleration of our economic growth and development”, but without sufficient economic growth, accelerated transformation will serve only reduce the productivity of business and parastatals by replacing experience with inexperience.

‘Business Unusual’ is how the President describes the work ahead of the country over the next year. If the ANC was proud of the work it has been doing and impressed with the progress it has been making then, most certainly, they would be ordering more Business As Usual – but they are not. ‘Business Unusual’ means Government has realised it must greatly accelerate delivery on the promises it made when 69% of the people of South Africa voted for the ANC in 2004.

This year will be the fourteenth year that the people of South Africa have been waiting on the ANC to deliver on its many promises and indeed some promises made in the 1994 campaign have yet to be delivered upon. During President Mebki’s second term as President, we have seen conditions deteriorate in areas from food security to electricity and government accountability, health and education. All of these issues are considerably to the detriment of the millions of poor and understandably expectant South Africans who voted the ANC back into power in 2004.

South Africans in the middle to upper-class brackets are less materially affected by deteriorating social and economic conditions than their poorer and less fortunate compatriots, and are thus more likely to weather the economic storm. In January 2008, CPIX, which best represents inflation as it affects middle to upper-class South Africans, rose to 8.8% whereas CPI, which best represents lower income earners rose to 9.3%. Poor South Africans are bearing the brunt of the economic woes resulting from poor ANC government policy and even poorer policy implementation.

President Mbeki’s ‘Business Unusual’ address and its accompanying Apex Priorities thus, unsurprisingly, list, among the top fifteen projects (of 24 in total), six ‘Social Cluster’ projects aimed at shoring up the “War against Poverty”. I would suggest as plausible the assertion that the ANC is worried that a great many poor South Africans are tired of waiting for the ANC and their promises and that in 2009 voters will seek other political parties to champion their rights. The General Election next year will test this assertion and it is my sincere hope that the ANC meets with stiff competition.

Written for and in the interests of a free, open and prosperous South Africa served by a committed, open and accountable government.

Warwick Bruce Chapman

Crime – Should I stay or should I go?

A friend mailed to to request some advice on whether or not her friend should stay in SA or not, being seriously concerned about crime since visiting South Africans living in Perth. Herewith my response:

I cannot argue on the point of crime. If someone feels that the (crime) risk of living in South Africa is not worth the general quality of life we have here, then that is something I feel other people should not interfere with. The way I feel about it, and I don’t expect other people to feel like this, is that South Africa needs people like you and I to be here and contribute if it is going to have any chance of sorting out its many problems – crime being the most critical of all. I am willing to risk, if in the wrong place at the wrong time, being a victim of crime if it means I get to live here with my friends and family and be part of what this country is fighting hard to become.

Crime to me is about vigilance – we need to know and respect the fact that it is a major problem in our society and learn to live with it. If it is something one cannot come to accept, then that person cannot stay in South Africa. If, however, you can accept that we are required to learn to live with crime – and all that implies – then I believe we can live a safe and happy life in South Africa.

What do I mean by learning to live with it – well, are you daydreaming at the robots at 2am, instead of being vigilant about what is around you? Are you aware of those two dodgy characters walking toward you – if you are, something as simple as stepping into a shopping centre might be all that’s required to scare them off. Are you careful not to be on the beach, concealed from view of everyone else at night, perhaps distracted by a friend or companion? These are simple things, but they can mean the difference between being a victim of crime and not.

Now let’s be clear that I do not for a second condone the crime situation in South Africa, but I do suggest that being as serious a problem as it is, we either need to accept it exists and learn to live with it – learn to be as safe and vigilant as possible – or, if we cannot or will not, then South Africa is not going to be worth it for you.

This is a question only you can answer and nobody can ever hold you to account for your choice. Is South Africa and being in South Africa the most important thing, or is the relative safety of another country with less of a crime problem than South Africa more important. You answer will decide whether you stay or whether you go.


Note: I included a copy of Steuart Pennington’s words on truth:

These are my truths (Steuart Pennington)

I have received so many mails recently regarding our current crises.
They force me to reflect on my own truths, rather than argue the merits of who did what.

These are my truths:

I am acutely aware of Africa’s problems and find them hard to defend.
I wasn’t aware that in black languages there is no word for “maintenance”.
I become angry when I read of the fracas in SA Cricket over selection.
I cannot defend the Judge Hlope debacle.
I become extremely impatient when I witness the hopeless incompetence of some in positions of authority.
I recoil with anguish when I visit the crèche in Soweto (which I have adopted) and see the plight of those living in poverty.
I am ashamed when I visit black schools to see how little they have.
I hate it when my friends refer to my compatriots with racist epithets.
I hurt when people, particularly the media, run this country down.

I am optimistic about our future.
I am proud of what this country has achieved over the past 14 years despite the contrary predictions of many.
I am learning that Africa is beginning to change for the better.
I am aware that English does not have a word that embodies ubuntu.
I love the warmth of African people and their ability to forgive.
I believe in our president’s and our governments resolve to deliver “a better life for all”.
I am in awe of the thousands of South Africans who toil, unsung, to help the less fortunate.
I am hopeful that Africa will have a better 21st Century that the previous five.
I pray everyday that I will remain proud of my country and that my actions will contribute to building a great nation.

And finally, I hope my optimism is firmly rooted in the reality of our progress and the goodwill of our people.

“I want to come home, but what about Zuma?”

I just recently got a mail from a buddy currently living on the grey, dreary, alcoholic and muddy island they call the United Kingdom:

“Im […] wanting to come back to SA permanently quite soon but I’m not so sure about it anymore with Zuma being voted in! What is your opinion? Do you think the country is going to go to ruins?”

I provide, for your interest, my response – and please note this is by no means a complete argument, but I thought it may be of interest to some:


Zuma has been voted in as president of the ANC. Mbeki remains President of the country and will be until 2009.

In order for Zuma to take over as President of South Africa (something which does not actually scare me that much), he has to be cleared of all criminal charges currently pending. He has fraud, corruption and racketeering charges laid against him and will be going to court in August 2008 to try clear his name.

The way I see it, if he is convicted of the above, then, well, he goes to prison. If he is cleared, then it is important because we would not want a State President with such a cloud over his head. Fact is Zuma is a popular, practical man. He’s a little stupid, but he knows he is no rocket scientist and to my mind that could well be a benefit – he’ll focus on what he can do and delegate the rest. This is certainly in line with everything I have read of the guy. I’ll tell you that I believe Zuma would do much more about the crime problem in South Africa than Mbeki has.

South Africa is not a Zimbabwe in the making and there are several reasons for this, but they are best explained in an article by a M&G journalist Jonty Fisher and my response (backing him up) to his position.

Take a look at my blog at and read: “M&G’s DG Report Summary” and “Response to the comments to Jonty Fisher’s ‘South Africa’s going the way of Zimbabwe’”. I would urge you to read as well Jonty Fisher’s original article at ThoughLeader, “South Africa’s going the way of Zimbabwe

The long and the short of it goes like this. This is the 21st century – the world over wants Africa to work. There are enough examples over the past 50+ year of what NOT to do in an African country. Priority number 1 is not to let any one lead become a leader for life. Unlike Zimbabwe, we have a population united around the limitation that our State President can serve a maximum of two terms (5 years each) as stipulated in our Constitution. Nobody is marching and toyi-toying to have Mbeki run for a third term as State President. Aside from being wildly unpopular for protecting people like Selebi and Manto, this is why Mbeki cannot be State President beyond 2009.

Priority number 2 (or even more important that 1) is an independent judiciary. Ie. Are your judges free from political interference. Again, unlike Zimbabwe, this is still the case. So our courts are free to judge against Zuma without fear of recrimination.

The way I see it, the future of South Africa is like the potential for shark attack when swimming out at backline. We all know that the chances of getting killed on the way to the beach are much higher than that of being attacked by a Shark, but nonetheless, thanks to Jaws, Jaws II, Jaws 2849 (ie. Zimbabwe and other shockers), we have this graphic image in our minds of the horror of being attacked, even though we know the chances are next to nothing.

South Africa is the 18th (out of 200+) most attractive destination in the world for foreign direct investment (read my blog “Excerpts from Manuel’s Mid-term Budget Speech (Delivered yesterday)”), we’ve made massive progress over the past 14 years (even if it is hard to see from day to day). We’re not going to throw that all away. Even the most communist of communist idealists in South Africa cannot deny massive progress has been made since then…

Come home kid. Rather take part in what’s happening here than rot on that sad, grey, muddy-ass island wishing you were here in the sun and fun.

K, shooting to the beach for a swim.

Ciao, Warwick

[Update: I came back from the swim and sent him another mail]

“Ok, I made the swim without getting attacked by a shark. It is ok for you to come home now.”

M&G’s DG Report Summary

The Mail&Guardian remains on of the most laudable publications in the South African media. M&G publish an annual report card for government departmental directors general (DGs) and today released the 2007 Directors General (DGs) Report Card. I have summarised the ratings below and highlighted some notable cases.

In summary, there are 14 DGs upgraded to or retaining a good rating, 2 who have been downgraded but retained a good rating and 9 who have been downgraded and have a poor to bugger off rating.  I regard as a good sign the four DGs who cannot be rated as they have not been in the job long enough – with any luck they have replaced someone who was not making the grade.

So, in my opinion, the above show progress is being made in ensuring that we weed out those DGs who are not getting results. Of great concern would be the 14 DGs who M&G rated as poor, and most especially the five of those who should be fired immediately. Let’s hope 2008’s rating card shows this figure decrease.

The rating card is as follows:

A: Take a bow. You are doing an excellent job.
B: Good, but room for improvement.
C: You’re OK, but that’s all we can say for you.
D: Get your act together.
E: Do yourself and the country a favour — resign.
F: You’re fired.

The following DG’s were upgraded or retained a good rating:

Duncan Hindle
Grade: A (2006: A)

Foreign affairs
Ayanda Ntsaluba
Grade: A (2006: A)

Home affairs
Mavuso Msimang
Grade: A

Science and technology
Philip Mjwara
Grade: A (2006: B)

Lesetja Kganyago
Grade: A (2006: A)

Frank Chikane
Grade: A- (2006: B)

Environmental affairs and tourism
Pam Yako
Grade: B+ (2006: B+)

Social development
Vusi Madonsela
Grade: B+ (2006: D+)

Provincial and local government
Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela
Grade: B (2006: B)

Trade and industry
Tshediso Matona
Grade: B (2006: C-)

Masiphula Mbongwa
Grade: B- (2006: C)

Manala Manzini
Grade: C+ (2006: C)

Vanguard Mkhosana
Grade: C (2006: E)

Minerals and energy
Sandile Nogxina
Grade: C (2006: E)

The following were downgraded by retained a good rating:

Public service and administration
Richard Levin
Grade: B (2006: A)

Itumeleng Kotsoane
Grade: C- (2006: C)

The following were downgraded or retained a poor rating:

Public enterprises
Portia Molefe
Grade: D (2006: B-)

Mpumi Mpofu
Grade: D (2006: B-)

Menzi Simelane
Grade: D- (2006: C-)

January Masilela
Grade: E (2006: C)

Lyndall Shope-Mafole
Grade: F (2006: E)

Thami Mseleku
Grade: F (2006: F)

Safety and security
Jackie Selebi
Grade: F (2006: F)

Water affairs and forestry
Jabu Sindane
Grade: F (2006: C+)

Land affairs
Glen Thomas
Grade: Fired (2006: F)

The following are new and cannot be rated as yet:

Arts and culture
Thembinkosi Wakashe
Grade: Too early to tell

Correctional services
Vernie Petersen
Grade: Too early to tell

Public works
Manye Moroka
Grade: Too early to tell

Sport and recreation
Xoliswa Sibeko
Grade: Too early to tell